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An individual with dual citizenship has long been regarded as “devi-
ant” in the modern nation-state system.1 The Hague Convention on 
Nationality of 1930 established the principle of a single allegiance by 
an individual to a polity—“one nationality for one person”—in order to 
clarify to which state an individual owed a military obligation (Faist & 
Kivisto, 2007, p. 32).2 Under such a principle, a state authority reserved 
political, economic, social, and civil rights for its citizens, and only 
those who had these rights were treated as moral equals and enjoyed 
full securement of their interests, properties, and identities. As the world 
has become more and more divided and institutionalized through inter-
national law and treaties, each individual has been strongly connected 
to a specific nation-state. Dual citizenship has thus been perceived as 
an abnormal situation for the modern nation-state. However, policy 
makers today are starting to see dual citizenship as an opportunity to 
promote economic development and to solve such social problems as 
a declining birth rate and aging population, rather than as a threat to 
sovereignty and social integration.
Since an increasing number of individuals hold dual or plural citizen-
ship today, the principle of a single allegiance is being challenged and 
the state authorities are attempting to reinterpret and reconstitute the 
boundary between the nation and the citizen. This is an issue not only 
for migrants moving to a new place, but also for people in diaspora.3 
Many migrant-sending countries have been trying to build networks 
with their diaspora populations during the last few decades, including 
India, China, Italy, Russia, the Philippines, Morocco, Greece, Turkey, 
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Hungary, Mexico, and South Korea. The development of transportation 
and communication technologies has not only accelerated migration 
but also helped those who emigrated, and their descendants, to stay 
connected to their “home country” from wherever they live. As a result, 
migrant-sending countries have introduced new policies to encourage 
emigrants and diaspora to “return” to their “home country,” although 
such policy changes are introduced not for the welfare of the diaspora 
population but are usually in the economic and political interests of 
the state authorities. The question of dual citizenship has become an 
unavoidable one for both sending and receiving countries. It is often 
seen as a sign of growing transnationalism and the declining power 
of the nation-state over individuals’ lives, since individuals with dual 
or plural citizenship are assumed to be relatively free from the con-
straints of the disciplinary and controlling power of the state while 
enjoying a transnational life beyond territorial boundaries. However, 
such an understanding appears to be misleading when we look closely 
at the growing acceptance of dual citizenship, which shows an inter-
esting duality: it is usually seen as a sign of the transnationalization 
of an individual’s activities and belongings, but it is also, in a sense, 
a new political institution to expand the power of the state beyond 
its territorial boundaries. Then, what does this change suggest? What 
impact and significance does dual citizenship have for each of the 
actors—government, immigrants, and diasporas—involved? Who bene-
fits from dual citizenship?
In order to take a step toward answering these questions, this chapter 
will look at the case of the New Nationality Law of South Korea that 
started to recognize dual citizenship, although in a limited way, and 
will consider the aims, implications, and limitations of this new policy. 
Responding to the rapid increase in non-professional migrant work-
ers and international marriages, as well as an aging population and 
declining birth rate (Lim, 2009), South Korea has introduced several 
policy changes since the 1990s. This study focuses especially on the 
dual citizenship policy introduced with the revision of the Nationality 
Law in May 2010 (effective since January 1, 2011). With this policy, the 
South Korean government seems to be trying to attract more skilled and 
talented immigrants, to develop connections with such skilled immi-
grants and with overseas Koreans, and to support the social integra-
tion of marriage immigrants and their children. While such a policy 
change shows South Korea’s move toward a multicultural society, it is 
simultaneously bringing about new problems to resolve. As it is still a 
new policy, looking at what are and will be the consequences of this 
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change may help us to gain a thorough understanding of the impact of 
dual citizenship on the modern nation-state and on the lives of modern 
individuals.
10.2 Citizenship and dual citizenship in the modern 
nation-state system
The notion of a specific territorial boundary encompassing a group of 
people, as well as the specific forms of government that developed, 
followed the advent of the modern nation-state in 16th and 17th century 
Europe. Various political institutions, such as territorial management, 
centralized authority, control of the nobility, taxation systems, and 
welfare institutions, were established in the process of state formation. 
With the development of modern nationality laws in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, it has become a common practice of the state to delineate 
inhabitants of its territory as citizens, by the institutions of citizenship 
and nationality—either by ancestral lineage or by birth. The nation-state 
came to hold the authority to decide who the “citizen” is and what rights 
and duties they possess (Hollifield, 2008; Koslowski, 2001).
As the volume and frequency of human migration has increased 
in a globalized world, more and more people today are living outside 
the country of their citizenship, and consequently the number of 
individuals who possess or seek dual citizenship is on the rise. Some 
commentators say that the question of dual citizenship is the point at 
which transnationalization of citizenship appears most prominently 
(Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 167; Faist, 2007, p. 1), and it puts states 
under pressure to reformulate traditional citizenship and encourage 
transnational activities of migrants. Is it really a sign of the declining 
power of state authority, though? If that is the case, then how do we 
explain the fact that more and more countries are starting to recognize 
dual citizenship today?
There is a growing body of literature on the issue of dual or plural 
citizenship, as more countries have started to recognize it over the past 
two decades. However, as a relatively new subject, there are not yet 
enough studies to lead us to concrete theorization. Researchers have 
addressed variously the reasons for its increase around the world. Some 
argue that those countries with a large emigrant population will allow 
dual citizenship; others argue that the increasing movement of people is 
a consequence of an ever more globalized world in the post-Cold War era, 
or the shifting character of conflicts to internal ones, or the development 
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of universal human rights norms. In addition, such domestic factors as 
the development of gender equality, pressure from emigrants, and grow-
ing social problems like labor shortages and an aging society are also 
responsible for the change (Faist & Gerdes, 2008; Koslowski, 2006). While 
some countries recognize dual citizenship, however, they do not extend 
it to immigrants living within their territorial boundaries, as in the case 
of the Philippines, Taiwan, and Poland. Others, such as the US, are not 
officially in favor of dual citizenship, but the Supreme Court and State 
Department recognized people to hold citizenship of multiple countries 
(Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 168). The question is why attitudes toward 
migration policy and dual citizenship vary between countries even 
when they share similar social, economic, and political conditions.
It is undeniable that economic and political interests are strong 
driving forces behind the recognition of dual citizenship. However, 
other factors, such as historical experiences and ideologies, have also 
had an undeniable influence on the patterns of citizenship and nation-
ality policies around the world today, as well as other social conditions, 
such as nationalist sentiment or images of immigrants as a threat to 
the native community in a given society. Recognition of dual citizen-
ship may help immigrants to be acknowledged as equal members in a 
society and may protect them from discrimination by alleviating the 
boundary between citizens and “foreigners.” However, the classifica-
tion and criminalization of migrants have been major practices of social 
control by the authorities, and the “otherness” of migrants can easily 
be translated into “fear” and “threat.” Also, if core political rights are 
reserved as a privilege of citizens, recognition of dual citizenship may 
convey a sense of devaluation of national citizenship and may appear 
as a betrayal by the state; from the perspective of native citizens with 
single nationality, those with dual citizenship may seem to enjoy more 
advantages by belonging to multiple polities.
Dual citizenship is often seen as a manifestation of transnational-
ism, or transnationalization of citizenship. In fact, the number of states 
permitting dual citizenship has been increasing in recent years, and so 
has the number of individuals who hold dual citizenship by birth or 
by choice. However, this does not instantly mean the declining power 
of state authority over citizens. Dual citizenship policy is rather an 
attempt by state authority to adjust to, and to re-establish its role and 
status in, the rapidly changing global environment. The question of 
dual citizenship is thus a field of negotiation between conflicting forces, 
including: protecting the privileges of citizens at the cost of the rights 
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of non-citizens; trying to extract more economic benefit from foreign 
labor by granting permanent residency or dual citizenship; finding a 
solution to social problems like an aging society and declining birth 
rate; increasing the options and opportunities of the diaspora com-
munity by dual citizenship; or enabling immigrants to stay mobile so 
that they can easily move to better opportunities. Although there are 
substantial differences in attitudes toward dual citizenship between 
countries, the question of dual citizenship is becoming an important 
item on the agenda of policy makers around the world, regardless of 
whether they recognize it or not. In the following section, the focus will 
turn to the dual citizenship policy of South Korea, and its implications 
for how it is changing (or will change) society. 
10.3 South Korea’s new nationality law 
and dual citizenship policy
Owing to rapid economic development since the late 1980s, labor short-
ages have been one of the urgent issues faced by the South Korean econ-
omy. The influx of foreign workers consequently transformed South 
Korea from a labor-sending to a labor-importing country. In response 
to increasing migrants and the growing social problems like declining 
birth rate, South Korea has been introducing remarkable changes into 
their immigration and citizenship policies since the mid-1990s (Lee 
et al., 2006; S. Lee, 2005). These changes have also aimed to attract more 
migrant workers to stay permanently and to prevent Korean nationals 
from renouncing their Korean citizenship. The primary goal of these 
policy changes is to promote economic development while alleviating 
social problems.
The revision of the Nationality Law in May 2010 (effective since 
January 1, 2011) opened the door to dual citizenship. It was the latest 
development in this series of changes made to immigration policies and 
related legal structures,4 including providing immigrant workers and 
foreign investors with easier access to the Korean economy, and allowing 
more overseas Koreans to work and stay in South Korea. With regard to 
overseas Koreans, the Kim Young-Sum administration initiated the New 
Policy for Overseas Koreans in 1993, which led to the establishment of 
the Globalization Project Committee in 1995 and the Overseas Koreans 
Foundation in 1997 in an attempt to strengthen ties between overseas 
Koreans and promote their rights and interests, as well as participation in 
the country’s development.5 The succeeding Kim Dae-Jung administra-
tion introduced the Overseas Koreans Act in 1999, which granted partial 
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citizenship to overseas Koreans.6 Policies that also cover non-Korean 
immigrants include: the Foreign Industrial Trainee Program, which 
started in 1991; successive Employment Permit Systems (EPS)7 from 2004 
onward; the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea of 2007; aboli-
tion of the Family Registry Law with the patrilineal family system, which 
was replaced by the Law on the Registration of Family Relationship in 
2008;8 and the Multicultural Family Support Act of 2008.9 Among these 
policies, the EPS and the Overseas Korean Act were important steps in 
extending, albeit partially, the scope of citizenship before the introduc-
tion of the New Nationality Law of 2010. What these policy changes 
show is an orientational shift in South Korea’s policy since the 1990s to 
actively utilize migrant labor rather than control them to ensure social 
cohesiveness.
The New Nationality Law of 2010 is characterized by: (1) the relaxa-
tion of requirements for the naturalization of competent immigrants; 
(2) the relaxation of the obligation to give up a foreign nationality upon 
naturalization (limited acceptance of dual citizenship); (3) the accept-
ance of dual citizenship based on a pledge not to exercise their foreign 
nationality inside the country; and (4) the prohibition of expatriation 
without completing military service. The New Nationality Law allows 
holding dual citizenship for immigrants upon naturalization to South 
Korea. The recognition of dual citizenship seems to be the government’s 
attempt to attract more talented immigrants to the country and to 
integrate immigrant brides and their children into society. It also aims 
to keep ties with overseas Korean communities, as well as those who 
emigrate for career and education, so that they can contribute to the 
development of the national economy and that the assets and pensions 
of aged overseas Koreans can be brought into the country.
The question of dual citizenship has been debated in South Korea since 
the early 1990s, but it was seen negatively at first because of concerns that 
it could be used to avoid military service or that it might cause a problem 
with the family registration system. However, as a consequence of the 
continuing outflow of the population (especially young and talented 
individuals), as well as the need for further foreign investment to recover 
from the economic crisis of 1997, granting partial citizenship for overseas 
citizens and the recognition of dual citizenship have become important 
on the agenda for the development of the state. In addition, the pres-
sure from Korean communities in the US, as well as the organization of 
Korean adoptees abroad,10 has increased since the turn of the century.
Consequently, South Korea’s dual citizenship policy sets several limi-
tations on who is eligible to take such citizenship. The policy excludes: 
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those who hold two nationalities as a result of “overseas birth”;11 
male citizens who have not completed their military service; foreign 
spouses of Korean nationals who could not maintain their marriage 
due to unforeseeable reasons (such as death or disappearance of the 
Korean spouse); foreigners living in the country for more than 20 years 
(namely, the Chinese minority); overseas Koreans under the age of 65 
(regardless of their citizenship); and low-skilled migrant workers.12 For 
overseas Koreans, the age restriction and the military obligation are the 
main obstacles. In fact, the overseas Korean community in the US has 
been calling for the Korean government to lower the age restriction. 
The current president, Park Geun-Hye, has been speaking about lower-
ing the age requirement for overseas Koreans from 65 to 55 since her 
presidential election campaign—due probably to securing the voting by 
overseas Korean citizens beginning with the presidential last election 
(December 2012). With regard to immigrants with no Korean origin, 
there are already several requirements to fulfill before obtaining a per-
manent or long-term residency visa or before applying for naturaliza-
tion. This makes it difficult for semi- or low-skilled migrant workers 
to have dual citizenship in South Korea.13 Thus, South Korea’s New 
Nationality Law can also be seen as an attempt to attract skilled migrant 
workers as well as Koreans educated abroad to return, while marginal-
izing low-skilled and poorly educated migrant workers, maintaining the 
national security system, and encouraging the economic activities and 
investments of overseas Korean citizens under the auspices of the state.
These concerns are not unique to South Korea, as the question of dual 
citizenship has been under debate in many other countries. However, 
the reaction to these questions and the changes made to policies differ, 
even among countries of similar social and economic conditions. Among 
Asian countries, for instance, Singapore and Japan have a similar, or 
even higher, economic status compared with South Korea. These three 
countries also share common social problems today, including an aging 
population, labor shortages, and a declining birth rate. However, nei-
ther Singapore nor Japan officially acknowledges dual citizenship. With 
its strictly polarized immigration policy, Singapore provides liberal and 
preferential conditions for highly skilled and talented professionals 
to work, while putting such constraints on low-skilled workers as not 
allowing family reunions and marriage with Singaporean citizens (Cho, 
2011; Low, 2011). These “global talents” tend to be highly mobile, 
though, while permanent residents are often reluctant to become natu-
ralized citizens because of the military service obligation, and many 
young Singaporeans are willing to leave the country for their career 
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or education, if given the chance (Yeoh & Lin, 2012). This has made 
Singapore increasingly dependent on non-resident migrant workers. 
As a consequence, today the Singaporean government is under strong 
pressure from both non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents to 
start recognizing dual citizenship. The Japanese government too has 
been reluctant to open its door to low- or semi-skilled migrants. Official 
acceptance of immigrant labor is limited to “through the side door,” 
such as granting Long-term Resident visa to Japanese descendants, 
allowing trainees on the Technical Intern Training Program not to be 
treated as immigrant labor, and accepting candidate nurses and candi-
date care workers from Southeast Asia under the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (Carlos, 2012). A social environment unfavorable to outsid-
ers may also prevent immigrants from becoming a member of Japanese 
society, which is reflected in the fact that the rates of permanent 
residency and naturalization show no significant difference from those 
in Singapore and South Korea, despite the fact that Japan has no man-
datory military service for male citizens.
There are, of course, problems regarding the treatment of, or range 
of discrimination against, low-skilled migrant workers in South Korea. 
Nevertheless, South Korea did introduce a dual citizenship policy, 
albeit limited. While there may be several complex factors that led the 
government to implement the policy, a major one may be the rapid and 
massive transformation in the composition of the population due to 
growing immigration since the 1990s. The development of such social 
problems as an aging population and declining birth rate also had an 
undeniable influence on migration and citizenship policies. Another 
factor may be the historical experience of having large emigrant popu-
lations as a consequence of colonization, decolonization, war, and eco-
nomic difficulties, which have developed into an abundant “resource” 
for networking, especially after the economic crisis in the late 1990s. 
Migration to Western countries, especially to the US, has long been 
a strong preference for many South Koreans in search of better work 
and educational opportunities, and it has now developed into lively 
networks and communities of overseas Koreans generating the “culture 
of migration” in South Korean society. South Korea’s policy of limited 
acceptance of dual citizenship may be driven by economic interest 
rather than universal human rights norms or diaspora welfare. Yet its 
limited nature and exclusion of low-skilled migrant workers show the 
government’s concern with the issue of competing loyalties and obliga-
tions, as well as immigrant integration and political cohesion. While 
South Korea seems to be shifting toward a multicultural society with the 
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New Nationality Law, it has brought about a new set of problems for 
society to overcome. That said, the rest of this chapter will discuss what 
implications the dual citizenship policy has for the changes happening, 
or that will happen, in South Korean society.
10.4 Dual citizenship, transnationalism, 
and transnational nationalism
While scholars of globalization have argued that there are increas-
ingly more transnational or postnational spaces for individuals, civil 
organizations, and NGOs to develop a transnational civil society, 
outside the modern state structure and the system of international 
society (e.g. Appadurai, 1996; Ong, 1999; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994), 
such a contrast between national and transnational is misleading. Both 
practices are often mutually dependent, and transnational activities 
can be embedded within the very structure of the state and interstate 
system, helping to reconstitute the state itself (Bauböck, 2003, p. 701; 
Varadarajan, 2010, p. 25). In a similar vein, dual citizenship has been 
a disturbing factor for the modern nation-state with regard to the 
principle of single allegiance, and it is often seen as a sign of growing 
transnationalism that enables individuals to transcend exclusionary 
nationalism. Dual citizenship, however, does not necessarily have to 
conflict with nationalism, but nationalism can play an important role 
in both the implementation and practice of policies targeting over-
seas Koreans. In fact, migrants today maintain connections with their 
families, friends, co-villagers, religious colleagues, and business partners 
with the help of communication, transportation, and financial mecha-
nisms. Such cross-border social networks enable them to engage in the 
economic, social, and political life of their country of origin, while 
simultaneously encouraging the sending countries to develop such con-
nections for their own advantage.
The growing volume and frequency of transnational activities of 
migrants—migrant transnationalism—can, in a cumulative way, have 
enough impact to change the state sovereignty and social life of people 
in both the sending and receiving countries (Portes, 2003; Vertovec, 
2004). On the one hand, therefore, “dual citizenship is an enabling 
device for transnational practices” (Bauböck, 2003, p. 715), as it gives 
individuals such rights as unconditional right of entry, right to bring 
in family members, right to own property, right to access welfare, and 
right to security and protection. On the other hand, though, it is part of 
a national project to re-establish and reinstitute the role and sovereignty 
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of states in a changing global environment and to engage with diaspora 
for national development. As Varadarajan writes:
the diasporic reimagining of the nation that characterizes the 
production of the domestic abroad is not a process that is driven 
by diasporas themselves. It is […] a peculiar form of transnational 
nationalism that has been embraced by states at the same time as 
they embark on programs of neoliberal restructuring. (2010, p. 49)14
In terms of South Korea, overseas Koreans have long entered into 
transnational activities across state boundaries in business, educa-
tion, artistic activities, social movements, and political participation 
(Lee & Park, 2008). They not only establish and maintain ties with 
Korean society through such cross-border activities, but also extract 
various benefits.15 The media—newspapers, satellite television, and the 
Internet—may play an important role in this process, since they enable 
people to communicate and share information within and beyond 
diaspora communities that network across borders, as well as to inter-
link the social lives of diaspora communities and South Korea through 
common cultural resources such as TV programs and music. The devel-
opment of such connections has made the South Korean government 
aware of the usefulness of diaspora networks to attract investment 
and human resources from overseas Koreans, and possibly strengthen 
economic, political, and cultural ties between their host countries and 
South Korea. However, it is also true that there is a significant difference 
between Korean diaspora communities in the degree of their transna-
tional activities and engagement with South Korea.
South Korea has introduced a series of policies for its diaspora popu-
lation since the 1990s that has extended the boundary of political 
belonging, albeit partially, beyond its territorial boundary. This was due 
to the changes in the political and economic environment following 
the end of the Cold War as well as political democratization at home, 
the economic crisis of 1997, and the growing numbers of overseas 
Koreans. The New Nationality Law of 2010 extended the boundary 
further by partially recognizing dual citizenship. The dual citizen-
ship policy can be understood as an attempt to reimagine the nation 
through the expansion of the scope of citizenship. In other words, it 
is a project of state-initiated transnational nationalism, with the aim 
of improving the political and economic standing of South Korea in 
international society by attracting talented migrants and developing 
diasporic engagement.
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It is, however, difficult to evaluate how successful the dual citizenship 
policy is in attracting and providing an opportunity for immigrants and 
overseas Koreans to enjoy full citizenship in South Korea. Although it 
has only been two years since the enactment of the New Nationality Law 
in January 2011, statistics shows that the number of those who acquired 
South Korean nationality has not increased drastically compared with 
previous years, but it rather decreased: about 13,000 people got South 
Korean nationality in 2012, while it was about 19,000 in 2011 and 18,000 
in 2010 (Table 10.1). The number of citizenship renunciations has also 
decreased, though still exceeding the number of naturalizations. While 
there is no concrete data on the rate of dual citizenship holders/applicants 
among the number of naturalizations and renunciations, it may be assu-
med that, overall, the interest in dual citizenship among immigrants and 
overseas Koreans without Korean citizenship is not so high. On the 
other hand, however, the rate of citizenship renunciations among those 
who hold dual citizenship is decreasing since the enactment of the New 
Nationality Law. Therefore, the expectation of the government from the 
dual citizenship policy is “to stop the net outflow of population and to 
contribute to the increased economic competitiveness of the country.”16
There are still several obstacles to be removed before the dual citizen-
ship policy brings about further social changes. For instance, manda-
tory military service still pushes Korean males with dual citizenship to 
choose foreign citizenship over Korean citizenship, and it also makes 
immigrants unwilling to naturalize, in order to avoid the duty for their 
Table 10.1 Acquisition and loss of nationality in South Korea from 2007 to 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Naturalization 8,480 11,512 25,035 16,303 16,085 10,540
Recovery 1,781 3,740 1,708 1,010 2,264 1,987
Acquisition 119 125 205 267 316 240
Reacquisition 158 122 129 543 899 616
Loss 22,802 20,163 21,136 22,131 21,472 17,641
Renunciation 726 276 886 733 1,324 823
Other 696 154 708 1,448 1,722 1,365
TOTAL 34,762 36,092 49,807 42,435 44,082 33,212
Note: ‘Other’ includes numbers for decision of nationality, choice of nationality, and keep-
ing of nationality.
Source: Ministry of Justice, South Korea, Churipgug-oegugin-jeongchaek-tonggye-yeonbo 2012 
[Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2012], pp.614–615.
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children. In addition, for non-Korean immigrants, except those who are 
married to a Korean citizen,17 requirements for naturalization, such as 
length of residency and residential status, occupational and economic 
status, and knowledge of the Korean language, history, and culture, 
often become hindrances, as these may cost more than the benefit of 
holding dual citizenship. Moreover, the existence of a narrow ethno-
racial concept of national identity becomes not only a barrier to social 
participation for immigrants, including overseas Koreans, but also leads 
to severe discrimination and exclusion that impede the development 
of multiculturalism in South Korea (Lim, 2009). Dual citizenship, then, 
may be no more than an instrumental choice for professional migrant 
workers and spouses of Korean citizens, which is where the debate about 
political belonging and national belonging rises to the surface.
Dual citizenship is a practice of transnational nationalism with which 
states attempt to expand the boundary of the nation and the citizen. At 
the same time, transnationalism of diasporas—for instance, associations 
of Korean American and Korean adoptees lobbying for dual citizenship—
is also inextricably linked with nationalism (Ang, 2001). Such forms 
of nationalism directed to/from outside territorial borders, however, 
have the potential to change the narrow view of nationalists who put 
sole importance on the home country, and to enable immigrants and 
diasporas to express their multiple and multilayered identities. If this 
is the case, South Korean society can overcome its narrow concept of 
national identity and belonging based on the dichotomy of inside/
outside (against immigrants) and purity/impurity (against overseas 
Koreans), and start to embrace not only co-ethnic “brethren” but also 
every stakeholder in society as part of the nation.
10.5 Is dual citizenship a step toward 
a multicultural society?
When thinking about the cultural diversity of South Korean society, 
there are broadly two issues of concern. One is the relationship of 
South Korean society with immigrants, including immigrant workers 
and immigrant brides who are not of Korean origin; and the other is its 
relationship with overseas Koreans, regardless of their citizenship status.
With regard to the latter group, the overseas Korean population 
mainly comprises people of Korean origin in China, North America, 
Japan, former USSR countries, and Koreans adopted overseas, some of 
whom carry Korean citizenship and some not. There are also Korean 
communities in South America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, 
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which are a source of return migration. Just considering the variety of 
locations, it is possible to say that there is already a multicultural diver-
sity within a population group categorized as “Korean.” These Koreans, 
with varying social, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds, are connected 
to South Korea with the help of the development of communication 
and transportation. Some of them “return” to their “home country” in 
order to find jobs or educational opportunities, or to satisfy their desire 
to identify with their ancestral land. However, it is not easy for second 
or third (or later) generations of overseas Koreans to be a part of South 
Korean society. A closer look reveals that their cultural differences are 
not regarded equally in the society, and they quite often face discrimi-
nation and marginalization because of differences in language, cultural 
behavior, and social experience, such as education and military service 
(Kibria, 2002). Since the enactment of the New Nationality Law in 2011, 
many Koreans who were adopted overseas are returning to South Korea 
in order to recover their Korean citizenship and to work and study.18 
However, they too come to feel that they are “foreigners” in society for 
having a different language and social experiences.
Such experiences are the consequence of the narrow ethno-racial con-
cept of national identity, in which not only non-Korean immigrants, but 
also “mixed-blood” and overseas Koreans, are marginalized and discrim-
inated against as not being “true” Korean. Especially among overseas 
Koreans, the Korean Chinese have been facing serious discrimination 
in South Korea for decades (Chung, 2008; S. Lee, 2005). Most Korean 
Chinese come as low-skilled labor migrants or as brides, and they have 
often been treated unjustly at work and at home: their common ethnic 
origin and language places them only slightly above other low-skilled 
migrant workers. Such treatment of Korean Chinese was evident in the 
Overseas Koreans Act of 1999, which at first excluded Korean Chinese, 
ethnic Koreans in the former USSR countries, and some Koreans in Japan. 
Although the Act was amended later due to opposition from civil society 
and the Chinese government, each Korean group from different loca-
tions was still treated unequally and hierarchically within the amended 
Act: the highest privilege was given to Korean Americans, while scant 
attention was given to Korean Chinese (Chung, 2008; Park, 1996). It 
is also reported that Korean businessmen’s imposition of their business 
models and cultural practices on their ethnic Korean business partners 
in the former USSR countries is creating an extremely negative reaction 
among these ethnic Koreans (Hü binette, 2009, p. 58). This demonstrates 
that there is a hierarchical view against diasporas on the side of native 
Koreans; placing diaspora communities in a lower status than Koreans 
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in South Korea. Taken as a treatise or an ideology, the idea of diaspora 
essentially contains the essence of differentiation. It bestows the “home 
country” with the authenticity and centrality for the national collective, 
without questioning the sociohistorical origin of the nation itself. It 
then establishes an unequal power relationship between those who are 
members of the “home country” and the diasporas outside.
In terms of immigrants of non-Korean origin, the government has 
introduced some policy measures during the last decade. Responding to 
the rapid increase in international marriages since the turn of the cen-
tury19 and providing support for these multicultural families, especially 
for foreign brides and their children, have become important items on 
the agenda. The South Korean government enacted the Act of Treatment 
of Foreigners in 2007, in which the protection of the human rights of 
foreigners and support for their social integration were addressed as being 
the duty of the state and local governments. One measure implemented 
by the Act was the social integration program for spouses of Korean 
citizens. The program provided its participants with certain incentives 
to obtain permanent resident status or naturalization. While it usually 
requires five years of residency with long-term residential status, written 
exams, and interviews in order to naturalize to South Korea, those who 
take the program receive an exemption from the written exams, and the 
time needed for the process is reduced.
Following the relaxation of requirements for resident status acquisition 
and the simplified naturalization process for spouses of Korean citizens, 
the government introduced the Multicultural Family Support Act in 2008 
and established more than 200 Multicultural Family Support Centers 
around the country.20 Local governments mainly operate these centers, 
providing such services as counseling for women and children, lan-
guage education programs, working support programs, and organizing 
volunteer teams for these families. Together with the social integration 
of marriage immigrants, there was a question of the increasing number 
of children with dual citizenship as a consequence of the new Family 
Relationship Registration Act of 2008, which removed patrilineal civil 
registration. More recently, the Korean Immigration Service prepared 
the Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, in which immigrant integration 
and achieving multiculturalism are the recurring themes.21 Although it 
is still a policy without a concrete and specific perspective, it shows the 
remarkable shift in South Korea’s policy orientation, which could not 
have been imagined a few decades ago. One goal of the dual citizenship 
policy introduced in this context was to normalize the status of mar-
riage immigrants and their children. It was, therefore, the growing social 
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diversity in South Korean society that brought about the introduction of 
the New Nationality Law.
Further study and careful analysis are necessary before understand-
ing whether South Korean society is moving toward accepting cultural 
diversity or trying to push immigrants with various cultural back-
grounds to follow and fit in with the standards of society.22 However, 
at least in policy, the South Korean government has made a move 
toward multiculturalism: the introduction of the New Nationality Law 
and immigrant integration policies are the latest steps forward, but 
definitely not the last. More comprehensive and systematic cooperation 
from national and local governments, as well as civil-society organiza-
tions and individuals, should be developed further in order for dual 
citizenship to bring full-fledged social benefits for every actors involved.
10.6 Conclusion
Dual citizenship policy represents both transnationalization of citizen-
ship and a nationalist project for securing state authority. Bloemraad 
notes:
dual citizenship inhabits a curious place. On the one hand, it under-
mines traditional citizenship by allowing, and even promoting, mutual 
belonging, claims-making, rights and responsibilities. […] On the other 
hand, dual nationality reinforces the centrality of nation-states because 
they continue to be the bodies that grant citizenship. (2004, p. 393) 
Behind the increasing number of countries recognizing dual citizen-
ship in recent years, there is a growing interest in the diasporas on the 
side of the state authority. It has resulted in various policy changes, 
including dual citizenship policy attempting to encourage not only 
remittances and investments from emigrants, but also the return of the 
educated and skilled ones. It has also changed the image associated with 
emigrants from “betrayers” and “escapees” to “heroes” and “develop-
ment partners,” especially in developing countries (Guevarra, 2009; 
Whitaker, 2011). Each country has different reasons for recognizing or 
denying dual citizenship; in addition, the rules and practices of dual 
citizenship vary between those countries recognizing it. Although it is 
undeniable that economic and political interests are the strong driving 
forces behind the recognition of dual citizenship, attitudes toward dual 
citizenship vary between states depending on their political, economic, 
historical, social, and cultural background.
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In the case of South Korea, the historical experience of having a large 
emigrant population as a consequence of colonization, decolonization, 
war, and economic difficulties, has prepared an abundant “resource”—
namely overseas Koreans—for networking. It became especially attrac-
tive for the government following the economic crisis of the late 1990s. 
The growing numbers of immigrants, as well as such social problems as 
an aging population and declining birth rate, have also fueled the shift 
in migration and citizenship policies.
The New Nationality Law, with partial recognition of dual citizen-
ship, represents the changing attitude of the South Korean state toward 
immigrants and the diasporas. It may become a springboard not only for 
resolving social problems and labor shortages, but also for recognizing 
the value of social diversity and realizing multiculturalism. However, in 
reality, South Korea’s immigration policies, including dual citizenship, 
still have many limitations and inadequacies in achieving the ideal.
Who benefits, then, from dual citizenship in South Korea? For the 
government, it is an attempt to attract skilled and talented individu-
als from abroad, as well as to generate economic gains from overseas 
Koreans through their investments and other transnational activities. 
However, these expectations seem quite difficult to fulfill, given the 
social and legal obstacles, such as persistent ethno-racial nationalism 
and suspicion against cultural diversity, or exclusion from the dual citi-
zenship policy of foreign-born Koreans under the age of 65 and male 
citizens who have not completed their military service. Such obstacles 
make dual citizenship an impractical and questionable option in the 
eyes of diaspora Koreans. The scope of South Korean transnational 
nationalism encompasses South and North Koreans, Koreans adopted 
abroad, and overseas Koreans around the world trying to reconstitute 
globally the nation (Park, 1996). The New Nationality Law may provide 
further institutional infrastructures for this reimagining of the nation 
beyond territorial boundaries, and then dual citizenship will become an 
arena where competing interests and identity-claims come into play. In 
fact, diaspora communities are not homogeneous, but consist of indi-
viduals and groups from different backgrounds with varying needs and 
interests. It is therefore an extremely difficult task for the government 
to balance and manage their interests with those of native citizens and 
other immigrant groups, because policies favorable for the diasporas 
or immigrants may cause opposition from native citizens. Without 
tackling this issue, however, a series of policies for the diasporas will 
not bring about any successful outcomes; and that is applicable to non-
Korean immigrants as well.
206 Shincha Park
Highly skilled migrants may stay without being naturalized in order to 
maintain their ability to move easily to other countries for better oppor-
tunities, or to avoid the military service obligation for their children, for 
instance. On the other hand, though, dual citizenship has the advantage 
of securing rights and status for low- or semi-skilled migrants. However, 
other than as migrant brides, obtaining Korean citizenship is not easy for 
low-skilled migrants, since they often encounter difficulties in satisfying 
the residential and work requirements for naturalization. Moreover, the 
still narrow concept of “national belonging” in South Korea on many 
occasions prevents them from being regarded as equal members of society 
even after obtaining Korean citizenship, which may make dual citizenship 
unappealing to immigrants. It is, therefore, possible to say that the dual 
citizenship policy of South Korea has not yet realized its potential benefits 
for any of the actors involved, due to its partiality and limits.
However, this is not to devalue the dual citizenship policy. Together with 
the multicultural policies introduced in South Korea, it has at least contrib-
uted to raising the question of diversity within the category of “Korean,” as 
well as exposing the existence of various immigrant groups already living 
as members of the state, local communities, and families. As Lim points 
out, tolerance of cultural diversity and the transition to a multicultural 
society cannot be automatically achieved with mere policy introduction 
(Lim, 2009). In order for the dual citizenship policy to be beneficial for 
all stakeholders, from the state to individual migrants, there is a need 
for developing awareness of and respect for cultural and ethnic diver-
sity. Various tasks are left for the society including further advocacy and 
awareness-raising, multicultural education at schools, legal regulations on 
corporate discrimination and hate speech, removal of educational obstacles 
for minorities, broader communication and dissemination of information 
at national and local government offices through multilingual media, and 
so on. Such efforts are especially important in countries like South Korea 
and Japan, where ethno-racial nationalism is persistent. The recognition 
of dual citizenship can contribute to foster a multicultural society. But 
such a potential will not simply be realized through policy implementa-
tion from the above. It is also and even more important to question about 
exclusive relationship between an individual and a political community 
and to recognize flexible and diverse forms of affiliations in order to go 
beyond the narrowly defined national and ethnic politics of belonging.
Notes
 1. Citizenship and nationality are quite often used interchangeably. Nationality 
is the legal bond between a person and a state. It denotes formal membership 
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and gives rise to rights and duties for the individual and the state concerned. 
While this legal bond is also commonly referred to as citizenship, the latter 
is, however, a set of rights and duties that can, in some cases, be partially 
granted to an individual regardless of their nationality, and it does not 
necessarily overlap with the scope of nationality. However, to enter into a 
comprehensive discussion of the widely accepted definitions for these two 
terms—citizenship and nationality—is beyond the scope of this paper, given 
the broad debate surrounding these two terms. Although this paper uses 
“dual citizenship” rather than “dual nationality,” it is still important not to 
conflate these two since understanding these as two distinct legal statuses 
may enable us to have a better understanding of an individual’s legal status, 
political belonging, and social identity/identification.
 2. This does not mean that dual citizenship had not become an issue before 
the Convention. In the 19th century, acquisition of nationality was already a 
matter of interstate cooperation for the US and European countries to resolve 
the competing claims of military conscription (Koslowski, 2001, p. 206).
 3. While the modern meaning of the term “diaspora” is originally based on the 
Jewish experience of dispersion and a promise of future return, the term has 
come to be used in a broader sense in recent years without the catastrophic 
connotations (Cohen, 1997), referring to emigrants and their descendants 
living outside their countries of origin or ancestry while still maintaining a 
connection with those countries. However, what the term implies is more 
than just denoting emigrants and their descendants. The usage of the term 
here is to denote not just emigrants and their communities who maintain 
links with their “homeland,” but also those subjects with whom state 
authorities actively engage in order to build a network for development. In 
other words, emigrants are treated as “diaspora” when they are recognized 
by the state authorities as the subject of interpellation and are incorporated 
into a sort of “center–outer” relationship against their homeland.
 4. For details about South Korea’s immigration policies, see S. Lee (2005).
 5. The policy recognized, for instance, the real estate ownership of first-genera-
tion emigrants, and increased the limit of the amount of property that could 
be taken out of the country, which overseas Koreans had been calling for.
 6. The Overseas Koreans Act granted partial citizenship to overseas Koreans, 
including legal residency, possession of land, and freedom to work in the 
country. It was the Korean emigrants and their descendants in the US who 
raised the initial idea of the Act, asking for equal treatment of former citizens 
living abroad in property succession and acquisition of real estate. Although 
the Act excluded Korean Chinese from the definition of overseas Korean at 
first, it was judged as unconstitutional in 2001 and was amended in 2004 to 
include Korean Chinese and Koreans in the former USSR countries.
 7. The EPS enabled employers, especially small and medium businesses, to 
legally hire the migrant workers needed for their business, while securing 
basic rights for the workers under labor relations laws, and even putting 
obligations on employers to pay for “insurance,” which covered the cost 
of returning and, if necessary, unpaid wages at the time of departure. The 
system was modified in 2008 to allow non-skilled workers to change their 
visa status to a permanent type by fulfilling certain criteria, such as five years 
of employment in the country and a good skill level. It was the first com-
prehensive program for the employment of foreign workers with conditions 
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equal to those of Korean workers, and it also contributed to reducing the 
number of undocumented migrant workers (Kong et al., 2010).
 8. The law transformed the previous registration system, under which the 
household was the basis of registering an individual’s address, represented 
by the head of the household. Under the new system, an individual could 
choose their own address for registration. The new system also allowed a 
married couple to give their child the mother’s family name, which was 
previously restricted to the father’s family name, and for the child to change 
their family name in the case of divorce or remarriage of a parent.
 9. For details of the Multicultural Family Support Act, see Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family website, http://english.mogef.go.kr/eng_laws/laws_12.
html, accessed July 8, 2013.
10. See for instance work of Global Overseas Adoptees’ Link (G.O.A.’L), http://
goal.or.kr/, accessed August 10, 2013. G.O.A.’L launched its Dual citizenship 
Campaign in 2007 to raise awareness about adoptees and dual citizenship 
in South Korean society, and published a report in 2010 (Global Overseas 
Adoptees’ Link, 2010).
11. “Overseas birth” means an act of traveling to another country with the aim 
of giving birth to a child there merely to obtain foreign citizenship.
12. Hi Korea: e-government for foreigners, http://www.hiKorea.go.kr/pt/main_kr.pt, 
accessed February 15, 2012.
13. Residential visa (F-2), Permanent Resident visa (F-5), and Overseas Koreans 
(F-4). A Residential visa (F-2) is granted to spouses of Korean nationals or 
permanent residents, and it allows a stay of three years only. It is also 
granted to foreign workers and investors upon satisfying certain require-
ments. Foreign residents are able to apply for a Permanent Resident visa 
(F-5) after residing in South Korea for three years with F-2 status. Those who 
came with an employment visa may apply for F-2 status by fulfilling certain 
requirements, and those who married a Korean national can obtain F-2 status 
upon marriage, and will be able to change to F-5 status after a stay of three 
years, whereby they will have the same rights as Korean citizens. However, 
the Korean government explicitly announced that it would provide “a high-
investment foreigner and a foreigner of superior ability in specified fields” 
with a stable residency qualification, job security, and preferential treatment 
for F-5 status if they were going to obtain F-2 status and satisfy certain educa-
tional and financial criteria. F-5 status is to be offered immediately to foreign 
investors who have resided in Korea for at least three years, invested more 
than USD 500,000, and hired at least five Korean nationals. It is also granted 
to professional and skilled foreigners who are specialists in the fields of 
science, education, culture/art, physical culture, and business administration.
14. Introducing the concept of “the domestic abroad,” Varadarajan (2010) 
analyzes the recent policies of the Indian state for its diaspora population. 
According to Varadarajan, there were two simultaneous, ongoing pro-
cesses behind the Indian state embracing the concept of people of Indian 
origin abroad as “the domestic abroad,” through such policy changes as 
the recognition of dual citizenship. It was necessary for the Indian state to 
bring in more foreign investment in the aftermath of the currency crisis of 
1991. However, the succeeding neoliberal economic reforms were, in the 
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eyes of the bourgeoisie and political representatives, “imposed by external 
forces, a fact that was symptomatic to the loss of the sovereignty and the 
legitimacy of the Indian state” (Varadarajan, 2010, p. 20). In order to resolve 
this dilemma, engaging with Indian diaspora became essential for not just 
economic development but also the representation of the Indian state in 
international society.
15. While there are many studies on the cross-border activities of diaspora 
Koreans, the publications (in Korean) of the Research Center for Overseas 
Korean Business and Culture (Chonnam University, South Korea) are useful 
resources for understanding the economic and cultural activities of overseas 
Koreans.
16. South Korea Ministry of Justice, Trends in Nationality Statistics, http://www.
index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/ stts/PO_STTS_IdxMain.jsp?idx_cd=1760, 
accessed February 15, 2012.
17. During the period from January 2011 to March 2013, 12,011 foreigners who 
were naturalized through marriage, became dual citizens after making an oath 
of not exercising their foreign citizenship within South Korea Ministry of 
Justice, Trends in Nationality Statistics, http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/
potal/ stts/PO_STTS_IdxMain.jsp?idx_cd=1760, accessed February 15, 2012.
18. “13 Korean adoptees obtain dual citizenship,” The Korea Herald, April 
19, 2011. http://www. Koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20110419000739, 
accessed August 30, 2013.
19. The rate of international marriages has increased since 2000, reaching 
about 13% in 2005. The major countries of origin for these brides are China 
(Korean Chinese), Vietnam, the Philippines, and Cambodia, and many of 
them are married to Korean men working in agriculture and fisheries.
20. For further information on the service of the Multicultural Family Support 
Center, see a Portal Supporting Multicultural Households, http://www.livein
Korea.kr/global/contents/contents_view.asp?idx=28, accessed July 8, 2013.
21. The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, 2008–2012, http://immigration.
go.kr/HP/IMM/icc/basicplan.pdf, accessed January 21, 2012, and the 2nd 
Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, 2013–2017, http://www. immigration.
go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_03/ShowData.do, accessed September 1, 2013. See also 
Building a Multicultural Society Together, http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/TIMM/
imm_07/image/bro_eng.pdf, accessed September 1, 2013. All published by 
the Korean Immigration Service.
22. For examples of recent studies on migrant integration in South Korea, see 
Y. L. Kim (2010), B. Lee (2010), and Y. O. Kim (2012).
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